



MAJOR POWER POLITICS: EVOLUTION OF DISCOURSE SURROUNDING HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN CONFLICT ZONES

FAIZA ABID
MARCH 2024

MAJOR POWER POLITICS: EVOLUTION OF DISCOURSE
SURROUNDING HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN CONFLICT
ZONES

Faiza Abid

Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies Lahore

March 2024

ABSTRACT

In the current global political landscape characterized by great power rivalry, humanitarian action finds itself entangled in the web of geopolitics and power dynamics. This paper argues that humanitarian action in conflict zones serves as a poignant reflection of major power politics, balance of power, and a *mêlée* between imperialism and humanity. While rooted in principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence, humanitarian endeavors are increasingly subjected to politicization, challenging their efficacy and integrity. Through case studies spanning regions such as Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, Africa, Northeast India, and Kashmir, this paper highlights how humanitarian concerns often take a backseat to geopolitical calculations, revealing inherent tensions between humanitarianism and *realpolitik*. Drawing insights from the evolving humanitarian landscape, this paper proposes recommendations to enhance principled and effective humanitarian responses amidst ongoing global crises. These include empowering local actors, reforming global financial mechanisms, establishing pre-arranged funding pools, introducing conflict-sensitive training, and promoting transparency in humanitarian action.

Keywords: Humanitarian Action, Power Politics, Major Powers, Conflict Zones, Geopolitics.

TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT	i
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. EVOLVING DISCOURSE SURROUNDING HUMANITARIAN ACTION.....	3
3. DETERMINANTS SHAPING HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS BY MAJOR POWER.....	5
4. MAJOR POWER POLITICS IN CONFLICT ZONE: CASE STUDIES	6
4.1 Israel-Hamas War (2023).....	6
4.2 Russian Invasion of Ukraine (2022)	10
4.3 Yemen Civil War (2014-Present)	13
4.4 African States.....	15
4.5 Indian Northern States	17
4.6 Kashmir Issue	20
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.....	23
5.1 Local Level.....	23
5.2 State level	24
5.3 Regional level	25
5.4 Global Level	25
6. CONCLUSION	26
BIBLOGRAPHY	27

1. INTRODUCTION

During the last several decades, the global political system has transformed considerably, evolving into a condition of great power rivalry. With the global ascendancy of China and a resurgent, rapidly arming Russia, the US encounters numerous challenges to its hegemony. This escalating political and strategic rivalry has extended its influence into the global humanitarian sector. Since its emergence on the global stage, humanitarian action has persistently aimed to exemplify “humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence,” adhering to the foundational principles set by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRS) in the 20th century, both institutionally and in direct engagement in the conflict zones.¹

Nevertheless, after more than five decades of existence in its current rendition, humanitarian actions encounter various criticisms and objections. The issue of politicisation has come to the forefront, with stakeholders, especially from the “global South”, alleging that the humanitarian sector has metamorphosed into a commercial instrument akin to others, serving the national interests of the donor countries as well as a globalised ultraliberal ideology.² This research argues that as discourse surrounding humanitarian action evolves, it serves as a poignant reflection of major power politics, balance of power, and a mêlée between imperialism and humanity.

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), in the wake of global conflict, climate-induced emergencies, and other

¹ Mark Millar, *The Peacekeeping Failure in South Sudan: The UN, Bias and the Peacekeeper's Mind* (London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Zed Books, 2022).

² Pauline Mahé and Véronique De Geoffroy, ‘The Relations between Humanitarian Aid and the Political Realm: Past, Present and Future - Groupe URD,’ Groupe URD, October 5, 2023, <https://www.urd.org/en/review-hem/the-relations-between-humanitarian-aid-and-the-political-realm-past-present-and-future/>.

drivers, as many as 300 million people across the globe will be in dire need of humanitarian assistance in 2024.³ Along with the highly pertinent conflict between Russia and Ukraine, tens of millions are gravely impacted by urgent crises demanding emergency assistance in Syria, Yemen, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, Haiti, Horn of Africa, Palestine, etc. In the wake of this deplorable situation, it crucial to reevaluate the humanitarian sector, especially in its relation to politics.

In the realm of international relations, some argue that interventions often operate within a framework of strategic self-interest. From this viewpoint, powerful nations tend to engage in humanitarian actions primarily when their own security and interests are at stake, thereby maximizing their advantages and influence. This suggests that humanitarian interventions might not always solely prioritize altruistic motives but rather align with broader geopolitical agendas.⁴ Within this framework, there is no space for humanitarian intervention per se: exercising public authority in a foreign jurisdiction can be perceived as a guide for expansionist agendas aimed at enhancing the relative power of the donor state or the intervening nation.

Clausewitz asserted that “war is a continuation of politics by other means”.⁵ If this stands true, humanitarian action can be viewed as an extension of domestic politics. This is because politics generates a micro-dynamics of cooperation and competition. For example, in some conflict zones, delivery of aid necessitates negotiations with rebels to establish humanitarian corridors; similarly, in areas under stringent control, insurgent groups may be the sole avenue for humanitarian assistance, especially when

³ ‘Global Humanitarian Overview 2024,’ OCHA, December 11, 2023, <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2024-enarfrsp>.

⁴ Anna Khakee, ‘Humanitarian Action in International Relations: Power and Politics,’ in *International Humanitarian Action*, 2017, 19–29, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14454-2_2.

⁵ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War* (New Jersey, United States: Princeton University Press, 1984).

the government is responsible for perpetrating abuses against its population.⁶ This situation not only undermines the principle of impartiality, but also gives rise to moral quandaries. The legitimacy and credibility of a sovereign country, as well as international humanitarian organisations, hinges on their capability to serve as guarantors of civilian protection.

This research analyses the involvement of major powers in humanitarian actions within conflict zones. When examining the role of major powers, the focus predominantly centres on the Western nations, particularly the United States. Case Studies of Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, various African states, as well as Kashmir and Northeast India are utilised to highlight how humanitarian concerns have been subordinate to geopolitical calculation, depicting inherent tensions between humanitarianism and realpolitik in the contemporary global order. Additionally, this study concludes by proposing recommendations to enhance principled and effective humanitarian responses amidst ongoing global crises. Notably, a significant limitation of this research arises from the insufficiency of scholarly data due to the recent emergence of conflicts.

2. EVOLVING DISCOURSE SURROUNDING HUMANITARIAN ACTION

The evolution of humanitarian discourse has seen a transition from Classical Humanitarianism to Resilience Humanitarianism, each reflecting shifting paradigms and priorities in addressing crises. Classical Humanitarianism is centered on four basic

⁶ International Committee of the Red Cross, 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,' December 2003, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/ihlcontemp_armedconflicts_final_ang.pdf.

principles namely independence, neutrality, humanity and impartiality. The purpose of this approach is to provide relief to populations affected by war, conflict or disasters. It takes an apolitical approach, respecting the sovereignty of states⁷. Therefore, it focuses on alleviating but not ending the conditions of war. Favoring neutrality, their assistance is limited to providing food, shelter and medical assistance. A major organizing principle of this paradigm is exceptionalism, as in it creates a strict distinction between crisis and normality⁸. Consequently, humanitarian aid is only required to temporarily fulfil the needs of people during crisis and exceptional circumstances. The central authority for determining aid are international humanitarian agencies while the role of local institutions is rendered invisible.

Resilience Humanitarianism arose as a critique of classical humanitarianism during the post-Cold War Era. It lays emphasis on both the negative and positive obligations of humanitarian agencies. The end goal is to create positive peace through resilience building⁹. Moreover, it argues that humanitarian action is political. Adhering to the principle of neutrality and refusing to condemn human rights violations signals indifference and complicity with those committing these crimes. Hence, neutrality must be discarded in favor of impartiality¹⁰. New humanitarianism argues that people possess the capacity to adapt and bounce back from the drastic conditions of wars and disasters. Therefore, aid must be focused on making refugees responsible and self-

⁷ Monica Adami, 'Disorder within the Humanitarian Sector: The Old versus New Humanitarianism Debate,' *Disasters* 45, no. 2 (November 2, 2020): 403–23, <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12426>.

⁸ Dorothea Hilhorst, 'Classical Humanitarianism and Resilience Humanitarianism: Making Sense of Two Brands of Humanitarian Action,' *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 3, no. 1 (September 10, 2018): 1–12, <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-018-0043-6>.

⁹ Monica Adami, 'Disorder within the Humanitarian Sector: The Old versus New Humanitarianism Debate,' *Disasters* 45, no. 2 (November 2, 2020): 403–23, <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12426>.

¹⁰ Monica Adami, 'Disorder within the Humanitarian Sector: The Old versus New Humanitarianism Debate,' *Disasters* 45, no. 2 (November 2, 2020): 403–23, <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12426>.

sufficient in governing and enabling their survival. It calls for an increased role in development, peacebuilding and crisis resolution. With regards to providing aid, they focus on local and national authorities, private sector and local humanitarian services. The purpose of humanitarian aid is to assist capacity building through localized solutions.

3. DETERMINANTS SHAPING HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS BY MAJOR POWERS

Humanitarian action, for decades, have remained a crucial component in dealing with global conflicts and crises. Along with UN agencies, several global NGOs have established themselves as entities to provide humanitarian relief under a global mandate. Some governments assign these responsibilities to non-governmental agencies, such as Norwegian Refugee Council, intertwining political considerations with moral judgements. This also acts as a means to supersede engagement with entities that do not align with Western interests and objectives. For example, amid boycotts from Western countries, Hamas encounters international exclusion; therefore, NGOs have stepped in to deliver services, carry out intervention, and provide humanitarian assistance in Palestine. This situation highlights a vital distinction between political affiliation and humanitarian efforts. The former president of the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) states, “Humanitarianism is not a political issue and it should remain separate from political maneuvering”.¹¹

¹¹ Didier Fassin, ‘Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life,’ *Public Culture* 9, no. 3 (2007): 499–520, <https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Fassin/Humanitarianism-as-politics-life.pdf>.

Despite the evolution of humanitarian discourse, as the international system shifts towards multipolarity, humanitarian aid is increasingly subject to major power politics and geopolitical trends, impeding the establishment of a unified understanding of purely humanitarian issues. The foreign policy objectives of a state and its involvement in humanitarian action are intertwined. While this relationship has endured throughout history, major powers' foreign policy has largely influenced humanitarian assistance decisions in the aftermath of the 9/11 era.¹² Within the expansive scope of 'foreign policy,' there exist numerous factors that influence the humanitarian actions of a state, such as national security concerns, monetary or market interests, and securing regional and international clout.¹³ The preeminence of these factors and decisions regarding aid are subject to change over time, varying from one conflict to another, and in consideration of external circumstances and internal domestic factors.

4. MAJOR POWER POLITICS IN CONFLICT ZONE: CASE STUDIES

4.1 Israel-Hamas War (2023)

The conflict in Gaza exemplifies how governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental humanitarian bodies, including various UN agencies, do not possess the capacity to conduct humanitarian operation without the political endorsement of their respective countries.

¹² Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, and Barnaby Willitts-King, 'Foreign policy and humanitarian action: an agenda for inquiry' (Humanitarian Policy Group, November 2016), <http://cdn-odi-production.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/media/documents/11125.pdf>.

¹³ Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, and Barnaby Willitts-King, 'Foreign policy and humanitarian action: an agenda for inquiry' (Humanitarian Policy Group, November 2016), <http://cdn-odi-production.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/media/documents/11125.pdf>.

Armed incursion by Hamas into Israel in October 2023, followed by large scale Israeli offence into Gaza has resulted in an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe in the region. According to the Health Ministry of Gaza, more than 27,000 people in Gaza have lost their lives, with as much as 66,000 injured.¹⁴ The impact of the conflict on the civilian infrastructure have been grave. Large portion of housing and civilian infrastructure in Gaza has been destroyed, leaving approximately 1.7 million people displaced and 2 million people at an imminent risk of famine.¹⁵

Western Government, particularly the US has largely failed in their duty to respond to credible reports of war crimes being carried out in the Israeli Hamas conflict. The US being the only country to veto the proposed UN Security Council calling for a “humanitarian pause” in Gaza, exemplifies this.¹⁶ Furthermore, humanitarian assistance to Gaza frequently comes with stringent conditionalities, requiring aid organisation to refrain from collaborating with specific local groups or government that do not adhere to Western policies. This, in turn, limits the efficiency of humanitarian action, restricting aid and assistance from reaching certain areas or population.

According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Palestine attained approximately \$37.2 billion in aid between 1994 and 2017.¹⁷

¹⁴ Laura Burton, 'Humanitarian Situation in Gaza,' House of Lords Library, February 5, 2024, <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza/#fn-2>.

¹⁵ Laura Burton, 'Humanitarian Situation in Gaza,' House of Lords Library, February 5, 2024, <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza/#fn-2>.

¹⁶ 'US Vetoes UN Resolution Calling for Humanitarian Pause in Israel-Hamas War,' *Al Jazeera*, October 19, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/us-vetoes-un-resolution-calling-for-humanitarian-pause-in-israel-hamas-war#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20vetoed,allow%20humanitarian%20assistance%20into%20Gaza>.

¹⁷ Abdalhadi Alijla, 'Beyond Politics: Rethinking Humanitarian Aid in Gaza amidst Disproportion and Disparity,' Arab Reform Initiative, December 15, 2023, <https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/beyond-politics-rethinking-humanitarian-aid-in-gaza-amidst-disproportion-and-disparity/>.

This aid has largely flowed through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has remained the primary conduit for humanitarian aid entering into the besieged enclave. Prior to October 7, the entity served 1.7 million registered Palestinian refugees in Gaza; however, in the contemporary context, about 20 donor states have frozen their funding commitments to UNRWA, including its three largest donors: the US, Germany and the European Union (EU).¹⁸ This decision came in response to Israel's allegations that 12 members of the agency took part in the assault by Hamas militants, reflecting the political nature of international humanitarian action.

In a stark juxtaposition, Western aid to Israel has been predominantly military, which includes financing for defence system, military hardware, and advance technology. Since 7 October, the U.S has authorised more than \$14 billion in military aid to Israel. The humanitarian assistance provided by the US to Gaza constitutes only 0.86% of the military aid given to Israel during the same period.¹⁹ The significant disparity in allocation of aid reflects underlying power dynamic and geopolitical trends, highlighting the complexities of international relations and strategic interests in shaping the policies of the states. The US unwavering support to Israel stems from three major factors.

¹⁸ 'Which Countries Have Cut Funding to UNRWA, and Why?,' *Al Jazeera*, January 31, 2024, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/which-countries-have-cut-funding-to-unrwa-and-why>.

¹⁹ Abdalhadi Alijla, 'Beyond Politics: Rethinking Humanitarian Aid in Gaza amidst Disproportion and Disparity,' Arab Reform Initiative, December 15, 2023, <https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/beyond-politics-rethinking-humanitarian-aid-in-gaza-amidst-disproportion-and-disparity/>.

First, the US deems Israel as its sole democratic ally in the Middle Eastern region and houses a crucial US missile defence base, which plays a crucial role in containing Iranian influence and curbing purported nuclear endeavours.²⁰

Second, Israel serves as the largest importer of US arms and has historically received substantial US aid. Notably, the Biden administration invoked “emergency authority” to fast track the sale of 14,000 120-milimeter tank munition cartridges to Israel, bypassing the customary congressional review period of 15 days.²¹ Therefore, US emerges as a primary economic beneficiary amidst the ongoing conflict. This depicts that monetary objectives have a significant bearing on major power’s involvement in the international humanitarian action.

Third, there is convergence of energy interests between Israel and the US. The bilateral energy cooperation agreement between the two offers unprecedented American assistance to Israel in exploring natural gas reserves within the two significant gas fields located off the coast of Gaza: Gaza Marine 1 and Gaza Marine 2.²² The underlying goal of Israel is to secure full control over these gas field in order to reduce its dependency on external sources for energy.

Therefore, the case of Israel-Hamas conflict depicts that global humanitarian strategy is complicit in a broader political agenda that ultimately undermines the humanitarian needs and rights of the Palestinians.

²⁰ Alan W. Dowd, ‘Why America Cares about Israel’s Security,’ The American Legion, December 12, 2023, <https://www.legion.org/landingzone/260767/why-america-cares-about-israel%E2%80%99s-security>.

²¹ Steve Bonitatibus, ‘Emergency Arms Sale to Israel Undermines Accountability,’ Center for American Progress, December 14, 2023, <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/emergency-arms-sale-to-israel-undermines-accountability/>.

²² Pınar Akarçay and Gökhan AK, ‘Gas Fields Offshore Gaza Strip: How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power In The East-Med?,’ In *Gas Fields Offshore Gaza Strip: How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power In The East-Med?*, n.d., 206–47, https://tasam.org/Files/Icerik/File/yeni-deniz-guvenligi-ekosistemi-ve-dogu-akdeniz_EKT_y-207-248_pdf_da7eb8ae-141f-479f-8883-83c1199607b2.pdf.

4.2 Russian Invasion of Ukraine (2022)

Even though no two armed conflicts can be regarded as the same, the rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) to safeguard civilians are universally applicable. In the Ukraine war, the US and the European powers have rightly endorsed this principle, denouncing flagrant violations by Russia, which include indiscriminate, unlawful killing, extrajudicial executions, and preventing access to basic needs, such as electricity, food, and water. For example, US President Joe Biden reacted to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a public statement: “A sense of brutality and inhumanity left for all of the world to see, unapologetically. There is nothing less happening than major war crimes. Responsible nations have to come together to hold these perpetrators accountable”.²³ However, on the other hand, the world witnesses a muted response to Israel’s assault and blockade on Gaza.

Between 2022 and 2024, Ukraine has notably become the principal beneficiary of US foreign assistance, receiving an extensive sum totalling over \$74.3 billion.²⁴ This aid encompasses various forms, such as \$1.6 billion for humanitarian relief, \$26.4 billion for budgetary support, \$18.3 billion for security enhancement, \$23.5 billion for weaponry and equipment, and an additional \$4.5 billion in grants and loans.²⁵ Concurrently, the European Commission is coordinating its most extensive operation within the framework of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. To date, all 27 EU member states have

²³ ‘Biden Denounces Bucha Killings as ‘Major War Crimes,’ *Barron’s*, April 6, 2022, <https://www.barrons.com/news/biden-denounces-major-war-crimes-in-ukraine-01649265907>.

²⁴ Jonathan Masters, ‘How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine?,’ Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts>.

²⁵ Jonathan Masters, ‘How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine?,’ Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts>.

collectively provided more than 145,000 tonnes of aid worth €860 million to Ukraine.²⁶ Moreover, the EU has mobilised aid from its rescEU reserves, comprising power generators, medical equipment, temporary shelter units, water treatment facilities, etc.

Apart from humanitarian and military assistance to Ukraine, the West has enacted wide-ranging sanctions on Russia that target individuals, banks, businesses, imports, and exports. Major Russian banks have been excluded from SWIFT, and Russian Central Bank assets, holding \$630 billion in foreign exchange reserves, have been frozen. As of March 1st, sanctions had resulted in the freezing of Russian assets, reaching a total value of \$1 trillion.²⁷

However, the Western response to the Ukrainian war is not apolitical and is rooted in great power politics. Prioritising the cost of aid over its strategic value overlooks the broader implications of the conflict. For the US, the war in Ukraine is equivalent to a proxy war with Russia, a war fought without any direct US military casualties.²⁸ Furthermore, by providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine, the US is investing in its own security and self-interests.²⁹ The war in Ukraine strengthens politico-military unity within the Western alliance. With the withdrawal of Afghanistan, the US image as a global power was tarnished, leading to perceptions of its terminal decline. However, the Ukrainian war has strengthened politico-military unity within the Western alliance. NATO

²⁶ European Commission, 'Ukraine,' European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, March 12, 2024, https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/ukraine_en.

²⁷ Congressional Research Service, 'Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: New Financial and Trade Sanctions,' *Congressional Research Service*, March 4, 2022, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11871>.

²⁸ Romina Bandura and Ilya Timtchenko, 'Funding a Decisive Ukraine Victory Is an Investment, Not a Cost,' Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/funding-decisive-ukraine-victory-investment-not-cost>.

²⁹ Romina Bandura and Ilya Timtchenko, 'Funding a Decisive Ukraine Victory Is an Investment, Not a Cost,' Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/funding-decisive-ukraine-victory-investment-not-cost>.

considered pivotal to Western security, has gained renewed purpose and expanded its membership to include Finland and Sweden.

Furthermore, the conflict has resulted in a detrimental impact on the global economy by disrupting global supply chains, trade, and energy markets.³⁰ In particular, it has led to higher gas prices, slowed global growth trends, and increased global inflation. Therefore, a resolution to the conflict would bring economic benefits on a global scale. Finally, evolving dynamics of great power rivalry, particularly in the context of the Ukraine war, is being closely observed in the Indo-Pacific region. Countries in this region, allies and adversaries of the US alike scrutinise not just military strategies but also issues of trust and reliability. Despite US pressure, some nations hesitate to align with either Russia or America. For instance, India's dependence on Russian weaponry and other interests leads it to maintain ties with Moscow, resulting in continued purchases and increased imports of Russian oil despite Western pressure.

Like the US, the EU response to the influx of refugees from Ukraine has also been grounded in geopolitical calculation. The EU evoked the Temporary Protection Directive, granting refugees from Ukraine automatic residency rights, as well as access to the European labour market, social welfare, housing, and medical assistance, extendable till March 2025 without the need to apply for asylum.³¹ At face value, such a response appears to be rooted in humanitarian concerns and commitment to the 1952 Refugee Convention but in reality, it is embedded in Europe's desire to protect the unified frontier against Russian aggression. While the EU has accommodated millions

³⁰ Peterson K Ozili, 'Global Economic Consequence of Russian Invasion of Ukraine,' *Social Science Research Network*, October 2022, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064770>.

³¹ European Commission, 'Fleeing Ukraine: Your Rights in the EU,' EU Solidarity with Ukraine, n.d., https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/information-people-fleeing-war-ukraine/fleeing-ukraine-your-rights-eu_en.

of refugees from Ukraine, migrants from the Middle East, such as Kurds, during the Belarus-Poland border crises were deemed a security threat.³² Therefore, the EU only pays lip service to humanitarian concerns; in reality, its migration policy operates exclusively under the framework of security and state interest, enabling states to avoid their responsibilities under the IHL.

4.3 Yemen Civil War (2014-Present)

Yemen is fractured by a complex web of interconnected conflict with intricate and mobile front lines. This has resulted in what the UN deems one of the “largest humanitarian catastrophe in the world”.³³ The major cause of the conflict remains the power struggle between the internationally recognised government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, backed by Saudi Arabia and its allies, and the Houthi rebel, a Shiite minority group from Northern Yemen, supported by Iran.³⁴ After nearly a decade of conflict, more than 377,000 civilians have lost their lives, an estimated 4.5 million individuals are displaced, and 21.6 million people, are in dire need of humanitarian assistance.³⁵ As of 2023, the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for Yemen required \$ 4.3 billion to reach 17.3 million most vulnerable people in need.³⁶ However, funding

³² Mieczysława Zdanowicz, ‘The Migration Crisis on the Polish–Belarusian Border,’ *Białostockie Studia Prawnicze* 28, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): 103–15, <https://doi.org/10.15290/bsp.2023.28.01.06>.

³³ Asher Orkaby, ‘Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare: The Real Roots of the Conflict.’ *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 6 (2017): 93–101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44823824>.

³⁴ Asher Orkaby, ‘Yemen’s Humanitarian Nightmare: The Real Roots of the Conflict.’ *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 6 (2017): 93–101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44823824>.

³⁵ Center for Preventive Action, ‘War in Yemen,’ Council on Foreign Relations, March 5, 2024, <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen>.

³⁶ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ‘Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2023,’ *ReliefWeb*, January 25, 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-january-2023-enar>.

faced significant shortfalls; for instance, by April 2023, only 20 percent of the funding was secured.³⁷

The humanitarian crisis is further exacerbated by a drastic reduction in food and fuel imports. Shipments approved by the United National Verification and Inception Mechanism (UNVIM) face frequent obstruction to prevent Houthis from profiting from fuel sales and taxation. However, these delays de-incentivises international companies from supplying fuel to Yemen, directly contributing to humanitarian crises. For example, The Yemen Petroleum Company faces a daily cost of \$20,000, which in turn prompts price hikes for consumers.³⁸

When it comes to the role of the US in the Yemen crisis, the action of the Biden administration is directed toward securing a decisive victory for the Saudi-led coalition. This stance reflects the US's apparent calculation that it is imperative to sustain strong ties with its Persian Gulf security allies instead of potentially witnessing these states pivoting towards Russia or China. Therefore, the case of Yemen depicts that the US and the European countries, despite professing support for human rights, clearly have double standards. For example, the West vehemently denounces the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but the nine-year war in Yemen has not garnered a resolution condemning human rights atrocities. Similarly, the UAE has announced opening its borders to Ukrainian refugees while only a few pictures of Yemeni refugees surfaced on the media.

³⁷ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 'Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2023,' *ReliefWeb*, January 25, 2023, <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-january-2023-enar>.

³⁸ Annelle Sheline, 'The Yemen War in Numbers: Saudi Escalation and U.S. Complicity' (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, March 2022), <https://quincyinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/QUINCY-BRIEF-NO.-22-MARCH-2022-SHELINE-1-1.pdf>.

Likewise, When Houthi rebels launched missile and armed drone attacks on Israel, calling for the cessation of the Gaza Strip invasion, the US and the UK conducted strikes against dozens of Houthi targets in retaliation. Therefore, western powers can rationalise military intervention against an expression of solidarity with a besieged population when trade is disrupted, yet they fail to acknowledge their own accountability for supporting the state enforcing the siege, i.e., Israel.

4.4 African States: A Case of Sudan Civil War

Throughout history, Western powers have exerted colonial control over Africa. This culminated in the Scramble for Africa in the late 19th century, during which nearly the entire continent fell under colonial rule. Consequently, US actions towards the region have often been characterised by a complex interplay of interests, sometimes exhibiting patterns of neglect and isolation. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the US engaged with Africa via the slave trade, paying little to no attention to the region. However, as the decolonisation wave aligned with the Cold War competition, American leadership directed its attention toward incorporating newly independent African countries under its orbit of influence. While, in the 21st century, US Africa policy has transitioned towards humanitarian goals, to date, Washington views the continent primarily as a “problem to be managed” as opposed to a “partner in shaping the next century”.³⁹ Additionally, as the US emphasises on Russian military presence in Eastern

³⁹ Leigh Kaplan, ‘America Ignores Africa at Its Own Peril - War on the Rocks,’ War on the Rocks, June 14, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/>.

Europe and the Chinese rise in the Pacific, Moscow and Beijing are outmanoeuvring Washington in Africa.⁴⁰

However, major powers do confront the shared reality, i.e., by 2050, Africa will comprise a quarter of the global population, boasting the largest workforce worldwide at that point.⁴¹ This, coupled with Africa's vast natural resources, makes it evident that any state with aspiration to influence global affairs in the coming decade cannot maintain a passive approach towards Africa. Given these dynamics, competition for influence between major powers has become an undeniable geopolitical reality in Africa. Even though Africa may not initially seem to occupy a prominent position on the international agendas of the US, China, or Russia, these rival countries harbour significant economic, geostrategic, and security stakes in the region. This intersection of great power interests in Africa has frequently led to conflict or exacerbated existing fault lines.

Due to recurrent conflicts in the region, humanitarian needs in Africa remain substantial. However, humanitarian efforts bearing traces of ethnocentrism have proved paradoxical in some situations. For example, during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, refugee camps were used by the army and militias as bases to continue their operation, which allowed them to exert control over the population while simultaneously profiting from humanitarian aid. In a more contemporary case, the outbreak of violence between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023 has destabilised Sudan's already precarious political transition, plunging the state into

⁴⁰ Marta Kepe et al., 'Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Africa' (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 13, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR969-2.html.

⁴¹ International Monetary Fund, 'African Century,' September 2023, <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/09/PT-african-century>.

humanitarian catastrophe.⁴² According to the UN, 7.3 million people have been displaced and 12,000 killed⁴³, and approximately \$2.6 billion is required to meet the humanitarian needs.⁴⁴ Even though a truce was signed on May 20 to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, challenges such as distribution hurdles, funding shortages, attacks on humanitarian, and harassment of medics due to their neutrality in the conflict have made delivery of aid nearly impossible.

Similarly, Biden's strategy in Sudan is designed to pursue its own objectives. Washington aims to curb the influence of the Wagner group, which it perceives as facilitating Russia's establishment of corridors to military installations in Libya and Central Asia.⁴⁵ Washington considers it a part of a broader Russian strategy to undermine American and French influence in the region. Principally, the US aims to achieve a ceasefire in Sudan, ensure its presence, and reinstate civilian government in order to attain its strategic goals and preserve critical maritime trade routes.

4.5 Indian Northern States

India, the so-called world's largest democracy, has transitioned from a secular republic to a Hindutva republic. This transformation was forecasted by an Indian writer, Khuswant Singh, in the early 1980s, who predicted that "Hindus, comprising 80 percent

⁴² Susan Stigant, 'What's Behind the Fighting in Sudan?', United States Institute of Peace, April 20, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan>.

⁴³ Suha Musa, 'In Sudan, Put Aid before Talks,' *Foreign Policy*, January 17, 2024, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/12/sudan-war-hemeti-burhan-democracy-aid-peace-talks/>.

⁴⁴ Hilary Matfess and Susanna Campebell, 'Sudan Conflict: Rethinking Pathways for Humanitarian Aid Provision,' Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 20, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/sudan-conflict-rethinking-pathways-humanitarian-aid-provision>.

⁴⁵ Erin Banco and Anastasiia Carrier, 'To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy,' *Politico*, July 5, 2023, <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/07/wagner-russia-africa-00095572>.

of the population, would eventually establish Hindutva as the state religion of India."⁴⁶ Presently, India grapples with numerous armed separatist movements in the region. The northeastern region of India, often referred to as the "Seven Sister States" (Meghalaya, Manipur, Assam, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, Tripura, and Nagaland), is the most volatile and insurgency-affected area in the country. Insurgent movements, ethnic tensions, historical grievances, and economic disparities manifest as demand for political autonomy from the Indian state.

In recent developments since May 2023, Manipur has been embroiled in ethnic clashes and sectarian violence, leading to one of the most severe humanitarian crises the state has witnessed in recent decades. The conflict ensued when the Manipur High Court instructed the State Government to evaluate granting Scheduled Tribe (ST) status to the Meitei people of the Imphal Valley, sparking tensions with the Kuki-Zo tribal community.⁴⁷ This potential designation would entail extended benefits, including reserved seats in the government, for the Meitei people. According to the UN Human Rights Council, nearly 200 people have been killed, over 70,000 displaced, and more than 17,000 homes and churches have been destroyed.⁴⁸ The conflict has led to the destruction of infrastructure, which makes transportation of humanitarian aid from the capital to the impacted district extremely challenging.

⁴⁶ Shahnawaz Rasool and Showkat Hussain Wani, 'Khushwant Singh as a novelist Reality and Myth- an Overview,' *International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews* 412 (December 2023): 4817–19, <https://ijrpr.com/uploads/V4ISSUE12/IJRPR20784.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Binalakshmi Nepram and Brigitta W. Schuchert, 'Understanding India's Manipur Conflict and Its Geopolitical Implications,' United States Institute of Peace, June 2, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/understanding-indias-manipur-conflict-and-its-geopolitical-implications>.

⁴⁸ Binalakshmi Nepram and Brigitta W. Schuchert, 'Understanding India's Manipur Conflict and Its Geopolitical Implications,' United States Institute of Peace, June 2, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/understanding-indias-manipur-conflict-and-its-geopolitical-implications>.

In response to the conflict, the European Parliament adopted a Resolution staunchly denouncing the Bharatiya Janata Party's (BJP) nationalistic rhetoric, calling state authorities to allow unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance, as well as permit independent monitors to conduct independent investigations. The Parliament also called for abolishing The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which provides armed forces with additional authority to conduct operations, make arrests, and employ the use of force to maintain the status quo in areas deemed "disturbed".⁴⁹ India views this resolution as inappropriate, asserting that Brussels lacks the authority to interfere in the state's internal affairs.⁵⁰ According to Indian leadership, restoring peace in the region is the responsibility of Delhi and Imphal. India's stance against unwarranted external intervention appears contradictory when considering its historical actions. For instance, India played a pivotal role in supporting the separatist movement for the independence of Bangladesh.⁵¹ Additionally, leveraging its historical advantage, India subjected Nepal to three periodic trade blockades, including one as recent as 2015.⁵² Thus, India's condemnation of international responses has stalled global efforts, hindering proactive measures and impeding progress in resolving the conflict in the Northeastern region.

Furthermore, amid the violence in Northeast India, Prime Minister Modi travelled to Washington in June 2023. The visit, characterised by VIP treatment depicts the U.S.

⁴⁹ BBC, 'Manipur Violence: India Condemns EU Parliament Resolution on Ethnic Violence,' *BBC*, July 14, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66161599>.

⁵⁰ BBC, 'Manipur Violence: India Condemns EU Parliament Resolution on Ethnic Violence,' *BBC*, July 14, 2023, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66161599>.

⁵¹ Navine Murshid, 'India's Role in Bangladesh's War of Independence: Humanitarianism or Self-Interest?' *Economic and Political Weekly* 46, no. 52 (2011): 53–60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41719989>.

⁵² Birat Anupam, '5 Factors Driving Anti-India Sentiment in Nepal,' *The Diplomat*, June 18, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/5-factors-driving-anti-india-sentiment-in-nepal/>.

endorsement of Indian governance.⁵³ It highlighted that discussions with India on trade, technology, and geopolitical trends supersede the U.S. concerns for human rights and religious freedom.⁵⁴ Additionally, the meeting confirmed that Prime Minister Modi's illiberal or anti-democratic actions are unlikely to affect the Indo-US strategic partnership, especially when Washington is engaged in swaggering competition with Beijing for the dominance of global trade and security frameworks. The US secured little in terms of hard security commitments from Modi during his visit. However, if the US advocates human rights in the Indo-Pacific region, it must integrate such commitments in engagement with allies and adversaries alike. Failure to do so only highlights blatant Western hypocrisy, where the espousal of democratic norms and human rights becomes selective and contingent upon geopolitical interests.

4.6 Kashmir Issue

Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Kashmir dispute has persistently remained a point of contention between India and Pakistan. The two countries have fought three full-fledged wars and one limited war over the issue, leading to tens of thousands of deaths, injuries, and forced displacement. However, the humanitarian response in Jammu and Kashmir has fallen short due to various factors, including the heavily politicised environment hindering International Law's neutrality. India regards the Kashmir issue as an internal matter, which minimises international

⁵³ Knox Thames, 'The Biden-Modi Meeting Was a Failure for Democracy,' *TIME*, June 24, 2023, <https://time.com/6289932/the-biden-modi-meeting-was-a-failure-for-democracy/>.

⁵⁴ Knox Thames, 'The Biden-Modi Meeting Was a Failure for Democracy,' *TIME*, June 24, 2023, <https://time.com/6289932/the-biden-modi-meeting-was-a-failure-for-democracy/>.

involvement, and limits participation from external stakeholders, including humanitarian organizations such as ICRC.⁵⁵

It is needless to say, conflict in Kashmir has evolved into a quasi-international armed conflict over time, warranting broader attention from IHL. Three key factors contribute to this characterization: firstly, the involvement of the UN in 1948 internationalized the Kashmir issue; secondly, the series of full-scale wars between India and Pakistan, coupled with cross-border terrorism, indicates a conflict between two state parties; and thirdly, extensive human rights violations by insurgents and security forces necessitate rules of humanitarian assistance akin to international armed conflicts, which are more comprehensive than those for non-international conflicts.

India has vested extensive powers to security forces via laws like AFSPA, granting them immunity from prosecution for human rights violations. Amnesty International documented over 800 civilian deaths from custodial torture and extrajudicial executions between 1989 and 2013.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the pellet shotgun is utilized by security forces as a tool to suppress protests in IIOJK despite warnings, causing significant injuries. Shri Maharaja Hari Singh Hospital reported 1,253 cases of eyesight loss from mid-2016 to late 2018.⁵⁷ The UN Convention classifies pellet use as torture and a violation of civil and political rights, constituting crimes against humanity.

⁵⁵ Maria Saifuddin Effendi and Mariam Fatima, 'Right of Self Determination and Kashmiris: A Conceptual Understanding and Perspective,' *Orient Research Journal of Social Sciences* 6, no. 1 (2021): 0–13, <https://www.gcwus.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/1.-Right-of-Self-Determination-and-Kashmiris.pdf>.

⁵⁶ Amnesty International, 'India: 'Denied': Failures in Accountability for Human Rights Violations by Security Force Personnel in Jammu and Kashmir,' 2015, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa20/1874/2015/en/>.

⁵⁷ UNOHCHR, 'Update of the Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019,' July 8, 2019, https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/PK/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf.

However, despite these undeniable facts, no security force member in Jammu and Kashmir has faced trial for human rights violations in civilian courts.

On 5th August 2019, in a unilateral move, the Indian government nullified the self-governing status of Jammu and Kashmir by revoking Articles 370 and 35A of the constitution. The former provided Kashmir the power to have a separate constitution, a state flag, and autonomy over internal administration of the state.⁵⁸ The latter vested authority to Kashmir's legislative Assembly to define "permanent residents", allowing the local government to grant special privileges, such as landowner, exclusively to Kashmir residents.⁵⁹ By abolishing Article 35A, India has reignited a long-standing fear among Kashmiris, i.e., alternation of the region's ethnic and religious composition. As non-Kashmiris enter the region, India's identity as a settler colonist state is coming to the forefront.

As a result of these developments, communal tensions in the region have further intensified, leading to systematic human rights abuses by the Indian government. For example, following the revocation, all communication channels were blocked, prominent leaders were arrested, and tourists were asked to evacuate the region. In 12 months, 11,000 young individuals were forcefully displaced, more than 200 killed, and nearly 1400 injured.

Despite Pakistan's repeated attempts to direct attention to mass atrocities and human rights violations, the international community has failed to invoke the R2P

⁵⁸ Munazza Khalid, 'Abrogation of Article 370 and 35-A, Human Rights Situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir and Response Options for Pakistan,' *Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences* 2, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 166–75, <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.1.14>.

⁵⁹ Munazza Khalid, 'Abrogation of Article 370 and 35-A, Human Rights Situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir and Response Options for Pakistan,' *Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences* 2, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 166–75, <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.1.14>.

Doctrine. This can be attributed to several geopolitical factors. South Asia has historically remained significant for major powers; for example, to attain control of hot waters in the Indian Ocean, the USSR invaded Afghanistan.⁶⁰ However, in the 21st century, major global powers are embroiled in a struggle for geopolitical and geostrategic influence in regions like the Middle East, Indo-Pacific, and Africa, often through proxy wars. This has dissuaded major powers from getting involved in the Kashmir conflict.⁶¹

Additionally, the US endorses an Indo-centric perspective of South Asia to counter Chinese influence in the region. For instance, India's Navy is essential for the US to safeguard its interests from the Arabian Sea to the Malacca Straits as it provides a robust shield for American naval supply vessels. Lastly, India's rising economic and military prowess in the region, coupled with aspirations of regional hegemony, have heightened security dilemmas for smaller South Asian countries. Therefore, to prevent unwarranted Indian interference in their internal affairs, smaller states often align their policies with India.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Local Level

- Establish partnerships between international humanitarian organisation and local stakeholders, including NGOs, community-based organisations, and grassroots

⁶⁰ Mehmood Hussain and Sumara Mehmood, 'Genocide in Kashmir and the United Nations Failure to Invoke Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Causes and Consequences,' *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 18, no. 1 (February 18, 2021): 55–77, <https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2020-0017>.

⁶¹ Mehmood Hussain and Sumara Mehmood, 'Genocide in Kashmir and the United Nations Failure to Invoke Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Causes and Consequences,' *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 18, no. 1 (February 18, 2021): 55–77, <https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2020-0017>.

networks. The latter must be actively involved in planning, decision-making, agenda setting, and implementation processes of humanitarian response efforts.

- Design funding mechanism that prioritise and facilitate funding directly to local organizations to empower them, and promote ownership and sustainability of humanitarian response. This could involve creating of sub-granting arrangements, pooled funds managed by local consortia, or multi-year funding commitments.
- Adapt humanitarian intervention to socio-cultural, political, and environmental context of the effected regions to ensure that humanitarian response is cultural appropriate and sensitive to local norms.

5.2 State level

- Establish formal coordination mechanisms to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. This can be achieved by convening interagency coordination committees comprising representatives from different sectors. These committees facilitate the exchange of information and address cross-cutting issues related to humanitarian response.
- Create an enabling legal and regulatory environment for humanitarian actions. For example, this can involve enacting laws and regulations to protect rights of humanitarian workers, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and ensure accountability and transparency.
- Invest in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts to address the structural cause of humanitarian crises. This may involve allocation of resources to support

mediation and reconciliation efforts, community engagement and dialogue, and capacity building to support local authorities.

5.3 Regional level

- Bolster South-South cooperation to exchange knowledge, resources, and best practices in humanitarian response. Collaborative learning during crises can enhance resilience and capacity-building.
- Regional organizations can play a crucial role in averting humanitarian catastrophes. By leveraging diplomatic channels, they can facilitate dialogue and mediation efforts. Furthermore, they can establish specialised response teams, equipped and trained to provide immediate assistance during crises. Similarly, they should create regional funding mechanisms and stockpiles of essential relief supplies, strategically locating them for rapid deployment during emergencies.

5.4 Global Level

- International community must streamline bureaucratic procedures to establish a more adaptable financial system. Scaling up the underutilised Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is crucial, as it can provide un-earmarked funding for flexible allocation based on emergency priorities.
- Optimise humanitarian financing to counteract power politics leading to resource extraction by establishing a pre-arranged funding pool. This pool, replenished based on objective priority assessments, should allocate resources across multiple years and sectors, acting as a central treasury.

- Deploy teams composed of representatives from neutral mediator to physically oversee aid distribution in conflict zones, ensuring fairness and transparency. Through regular assessments, they can identify gaps in assistance and advocate for equitable resource allocation.

6. CONCLUSION

The interplay between humanitarian action and transforming global landscape is complex, highlighting that humanitarian principles are not immune to the influence of geopolitical consideration. This has led to a complex tug-of-war between humanitarian values and strategic considerations. In evolving contours of humanitarianism in the context of a multipolar world order, traditional notions of impartiality and neutrality face growing challenges. Foreign policy priorities of major powers, shaped by concerns such as national security, economic interests, and geopolitical influence, increasingly shape decisions regarding humanitarian action. A comprehensive overview of crises in various region, including Palestine, Ukraine, Yemen, Africa, the Indian Northern states, and Kashmir depict several key themes. In each case, major power responses are heavily influenced by strategic interests in their interventions. West has majorly prioritised political alliances and regional stability over human rights concerns. Therefore, Selectiveness of western response in conflict-ridden region challenges the efficacy and integrity of international community and the international law. Therefore, there is a need for a more nuanced approached to humanitarian actions that takes into account both the immediate needs of the affected population and the broader geopolitical context in which the crises unfolds.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adami, Monica. 'Disorder within the Humanitarian Sector: The Old versus New Humanitarianism Debate.' *Disasters* 45, no. 2 (November 2, 2020): 403–23. <https://doi.org/10.1111/disa.12426>.
- Akarçay, Pinar, and Gökhan AK. 'Gas Fields Offshore Gaza Strip: How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power In The East-Med?' In *Gas Fields Offshore Gaza Strip: How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power In The East-Med?*, 206–47, n.d. https://tasam.org/Files/Icerik/File/yeni-deniz-guvenligi-ekosistemi-ve-dogu-akdeniz_EKT_y-207-248_pdf_da7eb8ae-141f-479f-8883-83c1199607b2.pdf.
- Al Jazeera. 'US Vetoes UN Resolution Calling for Humanitarian Pause in Israel-Hamas War,' October 19, 2023. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/10/18/us-vetoes-un-resolution-calling-for-humanitarian-pause-in-israel-hamas-war#:~:text=The%20United%20States%20has%20vetoed,allow%20humanitarian%20assistance%20into%20Gaza.Alijla, Abdalhadi. 'Beyond Politics: Rethinking Humanitarian Aid in Gaza amidst Disproportion and Disparity.' Arab Reform Initiative, December 15, 2023. https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/beyond-politics-rethinking-humanitarian-aid-in-gaza-amidst-disproportion-and-disparity/>.
- Al Jazeera. 'Which Countries Have Cut Funding to UNRWA, and Why?,' January 31, 2024. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/28/which-countries-have-cut-funding-to-unrwa-and-why>.
- Amnesty International. "India: 'Denied': Failures in Accountability for Human Rights Violations by Security Force Personnel in Jammu and Kashmir," 2015. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa20/1874/2015/en/>
- Anupam, Birat. '5 Factors Driving Anti-India Sentiment in Nepal.' *The Diplomat*, June 18, 2020. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/06/5-factors-driving-anti-india-sentiment-in-nepal/>.
- Banco, Erin, and Anastasiia Carrier. 'To counter Russia in Africa, Biden deploys a favored strategy.' *Politico*, July 5, 2023. <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/05/07/wagner-russia-africa-00095572>.
- Bandura, Romina, and Ilya Timtchenko. 'Funding a Decisive Ukraine Victory Is an Investment, Not a Cost.' Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 12, 2023. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/funding-decisive-ukraine-victory-investment-not-cost>.

- Barron's. 'Biden Denounces Bucha Killings as 'Major War Crimes,'" April 6, 2022. <https://www.barrons.com/news/biden-denounces-major-war-crimes-in-ukraine-01649265907>.
- BBC News. 'Manipur Violence: India Condemns EU Parliament Resolution on Ethnic Violence.' *BBC*, July 14, 2023. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-66161599>.
- Bonitatibus, Steve. 'Emergency Arms Sale to Israel Undermines Accountability.' Center for American Progress, December 14, 2023. <https://www.americanprogress.org/article/emergency-arms-sale-to-israel-undermines-accountability/>.
- Burton, Laura. 'Humanitarian Situation in Gaza.' House of Lords Library, February 5, 2024. <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/humanitarian-situation-in-gaza/#fn-2>.
- Center for Preventive Action. 'War in Yemen.' Council on Foreign Relations, March 5, 2024. <https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-yemen>.
- Congressional Research Service. 'Russia's Invasion of Ukraine: New Financial and Trade Sanctions.' *Congressional Research Service*, March 4, 2022. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11871>.
- Dowd, Alan W. 'Why America Cares about Israel's Security.' The American Legion, December 12, 2023. <https://www.legion.org/landingzone/260767/why-america-cares-about-israel%E2%80%99s-security>.
- Effendi, Maria Saifuddin, and Marium Fatima. "Right of Self Determination and Kashmiris: A Conceptual Understanding and Perspective." *Orient Research Journal of Social Sciences* 6, no. 1 (2021): 0–13. <https://www.gcwus.edu.pk/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/1.-Right-of-Self-Determination-and-Kashmiris.pdf>.
- European Commission. 'Fleeing Ukraine: Your Rights in the EU.' EU Solidarity with Ukraine, n.d. https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/information-people-fleeing-war-ukraine/fleeing-ukraine-your-rights-eu_en.
- European Commission. 'Ukraine.' European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, March 12, 2024. https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/where/europe/ukraine_en.
- Fassin, Didier. 'Humanitarianism as a Politics of Life.' *Public Culture* 9, no. 3 (2007): 499–520.

<https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Fassin/Humanitarianism-as-politics-life.pdf>.

Hilhorst, Dorothea. 'Classical Humanitarianism and Resilience Humanitarianism: Making Sense of Two Brands of Humanitarian Action.' *Journal of International Humanitarian Action* 3, no. 1 (September 10, 2018): 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-018-0043-6>.

Hussain, Mehmood, and Sumara Mehmood. 'Genocide in Kashmir and the United Nations Failure to Invoke Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Causes and Consequences.' *Muslim World Journal of Human Rights* 18, no. 1 (February 18, 2021): 55–77. <https://doi.org/10.1515/mwjhr-2020-0017>.

International Committee of the Red Cross. 'International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts,' December 2003. https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/ihlcontemp_armedconflicts_final_and_g.pdf.

International Monetary Fund. 'African Century,' September 2023. <https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2023/09/PT-african-century>.

Kaplan, Leigh. 'America Ignores Africa at Its Own Peril - War on the Rocks.' War on the Rocks, June 14, 2022. <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/america-ignores-africa-at-its-own-peril/>.

Kepe, Marta, Elina Treyger, Christian Curriden, Raphael S. Cohen, Kurt Klein, Ashley L. Rhoades, Erik Schuh, and Nathan Vest. 'Great-Power Competition and Conflict in Africa.' Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 13, 2023. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA969-2.html.

Khakee, Anna. 'Humanitarian Action in International Relations: Power and Politics.' In *International Humanitarian Action*, 19–29, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14454-2_2.

Khalid, Munazza. 'Abrogation of Article 370 and 35-A, Human Rights Situation in Indian Occupied Kashmir and Response Options for Pakistan.' *Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences* 2, no. 1 (September 29, 2021): 166–75. <https://doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.1.14>.

Mahé, Pauline, and Véronique De Geoffroy. 'The Relations between Humanitarian Aid and the Political Realm: Past, Present and Future - Groupe URD.' Groupe URD, October 5, 2023. <https://www.urd.org/en/review-hem/the-relations-between-humanitarian-aid-and-the-political-realm-past-present-and-future/>.

- Masters, Jonathan. 'How Much Aid Has the U.S. Sent Ukraine?' Council on Foreign Relations, February 23, 2024. <https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts>.
- Matfess, Hilary, and Susanna Campebell. 'Sudan Conflict: Rethinking Pathways for Humanitarian Aid Provision.' Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 20, 2023. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/sudan-conflict-rethinking-pathways-humanitarian-aid-provision>.
- Millar, Mark. *The Peacekeeping Failure in South Sudan: The UN, Bias and the Peacekeeper's Mind*. London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Zed Books, 2022.
- Murshid, Navine. 'India's Role in Bangladesh's War of Independence: Humanitarianism or Self-Interest?' *Economic and Political Weekly* 46, no. 52 (2011): 53–60. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41719989>.
- Musa, Suha. 'In Sudan, Put Aid Before Talks.' *Foreign Policy*, January 17, 2024. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/12/sudan-war-hemeti-burhan-democracy-aid-peace-talks/>.
- Nepam, Binalakshmi, and Brigitta W. Schuchert. 'Understanding India's Manipur Conflict and Its Geopolitical Implications.' United States Institute of Peace, June 2, 2023. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/06/understanding-indias-manipur-conflict-and-its-geopolitical-implications>.
- OCHA. 'Global Humanitarian Overview 2024,' December 11, 2023. <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/global-humanitarian-overview-2024-enarfrsp>.
- Orkaby, Asher. 'Yemen's Humanitarian Nightmare: The Real Roots of the Conflict.' *Foreign Affairs* 96, no. 6 (2017): 93–101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44823824>.
- Ozili, Peterson K. 'Global Economic Consequence of Russian Invasion of Ukraine.' *Social Science Research Network*, October 2022. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4064770>.
- Rasool, Shahnawaz, and Showkat Hussain Wani. 'Khushwant Singh as a novelist Reality and Myth- an Overview.' *International Journal of Research Publication and Reviews* 412 (December 2023): 4817–19. <https://ijrpr.com/uploads/V4ISSUE12/IJRPR20784.pdf>.

- Sheline, Annelle. 'The Yemen War in Numbers: Saudi Escalation and U.S. Complicity.' Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, March 2022. <https://quincyinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/QUINCY-BRIEF-NO.-22-MARCH-2022-SHELINE-1-1.pdf>.
- Stigant, Susan. 'What's Behind the Fighting in Sudan?' United States Institute of Peace, April 20, 2023. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-behind-fighting-sudan>.
- Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Sherine El, Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, and Barnaby Willitts-King. 'Foreign policy and humanitarian action: an agenda for inquiry.' Humanitarian Policy Group, November 2016. <http://cdn-odi-production.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/media/documents/11125.pdf>.
- Thames, Knox. 'The Biden-Modi Meeting Was a Failure for Democracy.' *TIME*, June 24, 2023. <https://time.com/6289932/the-biden-modi-meeting-was-a-failure-for-democracy/>.
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 'Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2023.' *ReliefWeb*, January 25, 2023. <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-2023-january-2023-enar>.
- UNOHCHR. "Update of the Situation of Human Rights in Indian-Administered Kashmir and Pakistan-Administered Kashmir from May 2018 to April 2019," July 8, 2019. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Countries/PK/KashmirUpdateReport_8July2019.pdf.
- Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*. New Jersey, United States of America: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Zdanowicz, Mieczysława. 'The Migration Crisis on the Polish–Belarusian Border.' *Białostockie Studia Prawnicze* 28, no. 1 (March 1, 2023): 103–15. <https://doi.org/10.15290/bsp.2023.28.01.06>.