India’s Defence Scramble

Trends in defence spending and procurements of a state demonstrate its inclinations towards specific national security priorities and geopolitical threats. An examination of India’s latest defence deals, investments, and procurements reveals a shift towards army and navy-related equipment. Although these can suggest an influence of the Cold Start Doctrine endeavouring to modernise its armed forces for rapid operational mobilisation, it is clearly an implicit realisation of New Delhi’s shortcomings. Moreover, these developments tacitly acknowledge Pakistan’s Armed Forces’ victory during the May 2025 war, particularly PAF’s effective deployment of the air medium under the illustrated guidance of Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, causing the IAF to lose seven aircraft. This unspoken recognition has ignited India’s scramble towards other avenues to expand the ambit of its warfare choices.

During the Defence Acquisition Council Meeting on 29 December 2025, capital acquisition proposals worth 8.71 billion USD were cleared in a bid to strengthen the operational capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces through the procurement of a diverse range of equipment and systems, with a focus maintained on long-range precision weapons and anti-drone systems. Moreover, India’s Union Budget 2026-27 further revealed an unprecedented allocation of 86 billion USD (7.85 lakh crore INR) to the Ministry of Defence, an 18 per cent increase from the previous year, as part of New Delhi’s attempt to achieve self-reliance, modernisation, and innovation. A huge portion of the budget is planned to support the 114 Rafale deal (32.8 billion USD) and Project 75I (8 billion USD). The latter is the Indian Navy’s (IN) plan to build six advanced conventional submarines with Germany. These developments purely focus on augmenting the Indian Armed Forces numerically, reflecting the wishful Indian thinking that numbers will make a significant difference. Rather, these events are indicative of the Indian recognition of its flaws, which the country is attempting to fill by beefing up quantitatively, rather than internalising the fact that it is not a high number of machinery and technology that wins wars, but how these tools are employed in an adaptive and coherent doctrine. A practical demonstration was the May 2025 war, where Pakistan won not because of sheer numbers, but because of the excellent employment of its weaponry and systems.

India’s probable procurements on the naval front include: testing of naval cannons, construction of next-generation survey vessels, working on ship-launched hypersonic glide missiles, long-range maritime loitering munitions for frontline warships, and possible induction of an advanced integrated AESA-based gun control system for naval warships. It is not the procurement and induction of specific naval systems and equipment that matter, but their operationalisation in a real-battle scenario. Following the false-flag Pahalgam attack, the IN put together a task force comprising submarines and frigates, led by INS Vikrant, its aircraft carrier, to show its supposed naval muscle. However, INS Vikrant retreated after reaching close to Pakistan by 400 nautical miles, dreading PAF and the Pakistan Navy’s preparedness to respond vigorously. Whilst this was a practical demonstration of the IN’s cowardice and poor ability to undertake operations, its dismal track record of accidents, with 15 naval accidents reported over the past decade, reveals gaps in the service’s safety protocols, posing a threat to human and marine lives.

The Indian Army, on the other hand, has also been eyeing the land-attack variant of the long-range anti-ship hypersonic missile, working on next-generation artillery shells, and acquiring low-level lightweight radars to boost surveillance. Despite Indian generals singing praises of the Indian Army’s supposed gallantry, its performance during the May 2025 war was short of valour as they raised white flags along the Line of Control, showcasing the Pakistan Army’s readiness to obstruct and frustrate any action by the Indian Army. Contrastingly, the professionalism and targeted retaliation of the Pakistan Army was seen by the launch of their Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles, effectively silencing the Indian Army with only two missiles. In light of the poor performance of the Indian Navy and Army during Marka-e-Haq, the threats of the Indian Defence Minister that in future Pakistan will “face the firepower and ire of the Indian Navy” ring hollow.

Among the litany of Indian defence-related plans, launching 52 military surveillance satellites and funding a high-frequency geostationary satellite for secure military communications are included, using ISRO’s existing rockets. However, India’s rocket tests, such as PSLV-C62, failed, which was carrying the EOS-N1 observation satellite and 15 other payloads developed by startups and academic institutions in India and abroad, including the UK, Nepal, and Brazil, further demonstrating flaws in ISRO’s quality control.

Trends in defence spending and procurements of a state demonstrate its inclinations towards specific national security priorities and geopolitical threats. An examination of India’s latest defence deals, investments, and procurements reveals a shift towards army and navy-related equipment. Although these can suggest an influence of the Cold Start Doctrine endeavouring to modernise its armed forces for rapid operational mobilisation, it is clearly an implicit realisation of New Delhi’s shortcomings. Moreover, these developments tacitly acknowledge Pakistan’s Armed Forces’ victory during the May 2025 war, particularly PAF’s effective deployment of the air medium under the illustrated guidance of Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Baber Sidhu, causing the IAF to lose seven aircraft. This unspoken recognition has ignited India’s scramble towards other avenues to expand the ambit of its warfare choices.

During the Defence Acquisition Council Meeting on 29 December 2025, capital acquisition proposals worth 8.71 billion USD were cleared in a bid to strengthen the operational capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces through the procurement of a diverse range of equipment and systems, with a focus maintained on long-range precision weapons and anti-drone systems. Moreover, India’s Union Budget 2026-27 further revealed an unprecedented allocation of 86 billion USD (7.85 lakh crore INR) to the Ministry of Defence, an 18 per cent increase from the previous year, as part of New Delhi’s attempt to achieve self-reliance, modernisation, and innovation. A huge portion of the budget is planned to support the 114 Rafale deal (32.8 billion USD) and Project 75I (8 billion USD). The latter is the Indian Navy’s (IN) plan to build six advanced conventional submarines with Germany. These developments purely focus on augmenting the Indian Armed Forces numerically, reflecting the wishful Indian thinking that numbers will make a significant difference. Rather, these events are indicative of the Indian recognition of its flaws, which the country is attempting to fill by beefing up quantitatively, rather than internalising the fact that it is not a high number of machinery and technology that wins wars, but how these tools are employed in an adaptive and coherent doctrine. A practical demonstration was the May 2025 war, where Pakistan won not because of sheer numbers, but because of the excellent employment of its weaponry and systems.

India’s probable procurements on the naval front include: testing of naval cannons, construction of next-generation survey vessels, working on ship-launched hypersonic glide missiles, long-range maritime loitering munitions for frontline warships, and possible induction of an advanced integrated AESA-based gun control system for naval warships. It is not the procurement and induction of specific naval systems and equipment that matter, but their operationalisation in a real-battle scenario. Following the false-flag Pahalgam attack, the IN put together a task force comprising submarines and frigates, led by INS Vikrant, its aircraft carrier, to show its supposed naval muscle. However, INS Vikrant retreated after reaching close to Pakistan by 400 nautical miles, dreading PAF and the Pakistan Navy’s preparedness to respond vigorously. Whilst this was a practical demonstration of the IN’s cowardice and poor ability to undertake operations, its dismal track record of accidents, with 15 naval accidents reported over the past decade, reveals gaps in the service’s safety protocols, posing a threat to human and marine lives.

The Indian Army, on the other hand, has also been eyeing the land-attack variant of the long-range anti-ship hypersonic missile, working on next-generation artillery shells, and acquiring low-level lightweight radars to boost surveillance. Despite Indian generals singing praises of the Indian Army’s supposed gallantry, its performance during the May 2025 war was short of valour as they raised white flags along the Line of Control, showcasing the Pakistan Army’s readiness to obstruct and frustrate any action by the Indian Army. Contrastingly, the professionalism and targeted retaliation of the Pakistan Army was seen by the launch of their Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles, effectively silencing the Indian Army with only two missiles. In light of the poor performance of the Indian Navy and Army during Marka-e-Haq, the threats of the Indian Defence Minister that in future Pakistan will “face the firepower and ire of the Indian Navy” ring hollow.

Among the litany of Indian defence-related plans, launching 52 military surveillance satellites and funding a high-frequency geostationary satellite for secure military communications are included, using ISRO’s existing rockets. However, India’s rocket tests, such as PSLV-C62, failed, which was carrying the EOS-N1 observation satellite and 15 other payloads developed by startups and academic institutions in India and abroad, including the UK, Nepal, and Brazil, further demonstrating flaws in ISRO’s quality control.