In an increasingly complex global security environment, the need for innovative approaches to arms control has become more critical than ever, particularly in the context of South Asia. The dynamics between the two nuclear-armed states, India and Pakistan, present unique challenges that require thoughtful analysis and strategic dialogue.
The interplay of historical grievances, territorial disputes, and national identities contributes to a highly charged atmosphere, where misunderstandings can escalate into severe crises. Since both nations acquired nuclear capabilities in 1998, their rivalry has transformed into a precarious balance of power, where the doctrine of deterrence plays a vital role in shaping military strategies and national policies. However, the potential for miscalculations remains alarmingly high, particularly given the presence of newer missile systems, aggressive military postures and the increasing sophistication of military technologies.
Moreover, the evolving geopolitical landscape, characterised by shifting alliances and external influences, further adds complexity to the arms control discourse. The strategic partnership between the United States and India, for instance, has implications for Pakistan’s security calculus, prompting it to enhance its own defence capabilities. Additionally, regional dynamics involving China, which plays a significant role in South Asia, further complicate the security environment and the prospects for meaningful dialogue.
Given these challenges, it is imperative that policymakers, scholars, and security experts engage in robust discussions aimed at fostering mutual understanding and developing innovative arms control mechanisms. By addressing the underlying issues and exploring creative solutions, stakeholders can work toward a more stable and secure future for the region.
The seminar provided a platform for insightful discussions and presentations by eminent speakers, shedding light on the importance of responsible nuclear stewardship, the evolution of military strategies, and the pressing need for effective arms control measures to foster mutual trust and reduce the risks of accidental nuclear exchanges.
Pakistan’s nuclear programme has neutralised India’s conventional military superiority, serving as a permanent deterrent against Indian aggression, constraining its military options and forcing it to adopt more cautious strategies in its dealings with Pakistan.
Pakistan’s FSD, including a robust triad of nuclear forces and a variety of missile systems, ensures comprehensive coverage and strengthens deterrence against all levels of conflict, particularly against India’s BMD.
Despite significant investment, missile defence systems, including those of the U.S. and India, have limitations, with success rates often below 60% in controlled environments. India’s claimed 90% interception success rate remains questionable.
While arms control may be a viable diplomatic option for Pakistan if balanced and non-discriminatory, disarmament must be rejected outright as it would weaken Pakistan’s strategic position and invite aggression from India.
MIRV Technology has augmented India’s ability to miniaturise its nuclear warheads, thereby also enhancing its cruise missile capabilities to the detriment of regional strategic stability.
India’s shifting nuclear posture, from recessed deterrence to counter-force first strike options, potential changes in the No-First-Use policy and cannisterisation of missile systems, altogether raise new challenges for regional strategic stability.
Traditional arms control agreements between India and Pakistan, such as those controlling weapons production and deployment, have been largely ineffective, whereas CBMs have had limited success in building trust.
The idea of triangular or quadrilateral missile restraint regimes involving Pakistan, India, China, and US is unrealistic. China’s focus on deterring the US makes any restraint regime between all three unfeasible.
FSD must be maintained and enhanced to counter both conventional and tactical threats, including India’s Cold Start Doctrine, ensuring that deterrence operates effectively at all levels.
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has closed the space for any conventional misadventure from the Indian side. Pakistan must continue to prioritise a strong nuclear deterrent posture to prevent any future escalation and maintain regional stability.
While adopting new technologies, Pakistan must avoid being swayed by costly innovations that may not deliver significant strategic advantages, focusing instead on proven, practical solutions.
Pakistan must consider India’s shift towards a more ready-on-launch nuclear posture and closely monitor the internal debates surrounding its No-First-Use policy. This vigilance will help Pakistan reassess its own strategic force readiness and prepare for potential changes that could impact regional stability.
With compressed reaction times, the utility of liquid-fuelled missiles may diminish, and Pakistan may have to consider phasing them out in favour of more rapid-launch alternatives.
Targeted CBMs in areas like cyber-security, prevention of incidents at sea, and information sharing on peaceful nuclear technology could pave the way for improved relations between India and Pakistan.
Arms control initiatives, while valuable in certain contexts, should not be seen as the primary tool for achieving strategic stability. Pakistan must remain focused on maintaining its deterrence capabilities as the core element of its security strategy.
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