Agents of Influence: How the KGB Subverted Western Democracies

“Agents of Influence: How the KGB Subverted Western Democracies” by Mark Hollingsworth is a remarkable reminiscence of the Cold War and the tussle between the KGB and Western intelligence agencies that created a world of “chaos, fear and pervasive uncertainty in which nobody could be trusted.” Mark Hollingsworth is a renowned journalist, historian and author of several books, including “Defending the Realm: MI5 and the Shayler Affairs”, “Saudi Babylon: Torture, Corruption and Cover-Up Inside the House of Saud”, etc., highlighting his unique interest and journalistic experience in rare and controversial politico-historical accounts. Agents of Influence is a natural representation of the author’s expertise in areas of disinformation, intelligence activities, and covert surveillance.
In this book, Hollingsworth provides a detailed insight into the journey of the KGB from its birth to becoming one of the most prominent actors during the Cold War, infiltrating key political circles of the West through disinformation and fake news. With no oversight and accountability, the KGB engaged in countless covert operations with political ramifications for the Western countries, especially the US and UK. According to the author, there were only 350 FBI informants in the USSR in the 1980s whereas the KGB had stationed around 1,300 officers in the US. The book underlines kompromat as the key KGB and Soviet strategy during the Cold War. Kompromat is a Russian term which entails damaging information collected for blackmailing, manipulating and exerting influence over bodies and individuals that do not align with one’s interests. Interestingly, the author has also discussed how the USSR used kompromat not only against the West but also within its very borders to defame and undermine individuals in political opposition.
The book contextualises Soviet/Russian understanding of political warfare as covert funding of political figures, fake news, and recruiting agents. The key interest is to exert influence to achieve particular objectives in diplomatic negotiations and military outcomes by means of manipulating public opinion through forged documents, doctored photographs, planted drugs, illicit videos, assassination, etc., which the author calls dirty tricks. The book is entirely based on KGB’s, and now FSB’s, black propaganda techniques and covert operations that made these organisations „a state within a state‟ with no fear of consequences and no system of accountability.
Although covertness was a central aspect of Soviet operations during the Cold War, as it was of the West, Hollingsworth’s argument that “covert operations were a chief weapon of Soviet foreign policy” is simply an overstatement. While the book covers a range of KGB operations, attempting to influence or defame the West, the book does not highlight the fact that their success largely depended on the interests, prejudices, and assumptions of the targeted audience. For instance, Operation Denver which regarded HIV/AIDS among non-whites as a product of the American biowarfare programme only fuelled the already circulating claims in American social circles. Similarly, Operation Ryan which aimed at painting Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as aggressive leaders plotting a nuclear attack had a strong basis in the deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles at American bases in West Germany, targeted towards the western areas of the USSR.
Interestingly, the author argues that the kompromat of the KGB did not end with the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 but remains a major element of Russian foreign policy even today. Being a former KGB officer, Russian President Vladimir Putin is seen as an intelligence hawk who continues to hinge on kompromat and Cold War espionage to achieve national interests while subverting Western democratic ideals. According to the author, Russia might not be a communist regime anymore but it is an authoritarian state with a former KGB spy as its president and former KGB officers forming the country’s main political elite. This consolidated and dubious power structure allows Putin to achieve his goals of reviving the Soviet Union and making significant political and financial profits from its oil and gas resources.
As we look beyond the boxed perspective of this book and into the ground realities, it appears that the West has also often used false intelligence stories, disinformation and fake news to achieve its hegemonic goals as well as exert control over hydrocarbon resources. The whole Iraq intervention fallacy of 2003 based on allegations of Saddam Hussain possessing weapons of mass destruction presents a lucid picture of how Western foreign policy largely relies on and significantly makes use of disinformation and counterfeit intelligence to achieve its goals that cannot be characterised as democratic in any manner. Thus, in the book where the author quotes former CIA Director Robert Gates praising American intelligence for its analytical strength and rendering the KGB as having no analytical capabilities only presents a distorted account.
The language of the book and characterisation of the Soviet/Russian intelligence activities having a sole agenda of destabilisation of the West presents a skewed perspective of the author. It would not be wrong to assert that although the KGB must have engaged in multiple covert operations against the West, the so-called Western democratic ideals are not so virtuous themselves. Calling the KGB officers „manipulating agents‟ while rendering the FBI informants simply as „counter-intelligence officers‟ very much represents Western bias and prejudice of the author.
In the book, the author mainly covers the Cold War history while the current unfolding war between Russia and the West with NATO as a key player does not enjoy a detailed account in the book. Moreover, it is only the FSB described as the successor to the KGB whereas several other successor agencies were born when the KGB was disbanded, such as the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Federal Protective Service (FSO), and the Main Intelligent Directorate (GRU). It also appears that the number of FSB and GRU officers mentioned in the book is exaggerated, further spotlighting Hollingsworth’s muddy attempt to cast Russia in a negative light.
Overall, the book “Agents of Influence: How the KGB Subverted Western Democracies” thoroughly explores how the political structure of the USSR and currently Russia under President Putin, revolves around kompromat to achieve foreign policy objectives. However, if the agenda of the book was to highlight the covert role and unaccountable influence of intelligence agencies in geopolitical events unfolding around us, it largely falls short of maintaining a balanced and unbiased perspective. The entire focus on the negative portrayal of the KGB and Putin not only makes the book indigestible but strips it of its true value. However, it would make a good read for anyone looking for a Western perspective on Russian intelligence both in history and the contemporary era.