Chanakya’s Shadow over Kabul

The universal truth that you cannot choose your neighbours represents an immutable reality for Pak­istan and Afghanistan, two countries bound historically, linguis­tically, and cultural­ly. Yet shared geog­raphy cannot become an excuse for Islam­abad to tolerate Kabul’s unfulfilled commitments, allow­ing India to foment unrest with­in Pakistan through terrorism by using its soil. Afghanistan does not realise that it is a pawn in In­dia’s strategy guided by the In­dian strategist Chanakya’s max­im of befriending an enemy’s neighbour and exploiting them to their advantage. This has led to increased cosying between In­dia and Afghanistan, signalled by New Delhi’s decision to reopen its embassy in Kabul and Amir Muttaqi’s visit to India, during which he issued a joint state­ment against Pakistan by refer­ring to Kashmir as part of India.

Acting on India’s behalf by sup­porting and providing sanctu­aries to Fitna al-Khawarij and Fitna al-Hindustan, terrorist or­ganisations maiming and claim­ing innocent Pakistani lives, has not done Afghanistan any fa­vours, as neither its sovereign­ty has been strengthened, nor its regional standing has improved. Moreover, Afghanistan and India cannot have a robust relation­ship because of their divergent ideologies and values. Kabul’s behaviour, working against Is­lamabad’s interests, strikingly contrasts with Pakistan’s histori­cal approach of strategic restraint and accommodation, exemplified by hosting millions of Afghan ref­ugees, facilitating trade and tran­sit, and providing humanitarian and developmental aid.

Exasperated by the Taliban’s hollow reassurances that the Af­ghan territory is not used for ter­rorism against any country and after exhausting incentives and economic pressure with no tan­gible results, Pakistan’s patience reached its limit. Pakistan resort­ed to limited punitive measures in self defence, carrying out air­strikes against the infrastruc­ture and leadership of Fitna al Khawarij in October 2025. This action came after Pakistan’s re­quests to the Afghan Taliban to rein in its support for terrorist organisations remained unheed­ed. In the aftermath, a ceasefire was agreed upon with the medi­ation of Turkiye and Qatar. How­ever, the negotiating process laid bare the Afghan Taliban’s capri­ciousness and intransigence as they consistently hesitated to take verifiable action against mil­itant safe havens, despite Pak­istan presenting photographic and documentary evidence of op­erations originating from there.

Even though the relations be­tween Pakistan and its Western neighbour have soured, Islam­abad has repeatedly invested in reducing tensions through dia­logue. Amongst recent examples is the closed-door round of talks held in Riyadh early December 2025, which concluded without a substantive outcome. The Af­ghan Taliban turned down dia­logue in mid- December 2025 when Tehran hosted regional envoys on developments relat­ed to Afghanistan. This is anoth­er demonstration of the Afghan Taliban’s unmet reciprocity, con­trary to Pakistan’s eagerness for brotherly relations sans the ter­rorist bonhomie. Such prudence is essential for regional stability, as the net effect of these strained relations will culminate in eco­nomic instability, discourag­ing investments and disrupting trade corridors. The repercus­sions will be felt by both states, but more severely by Afghani­stan, which is already confront­ed with severe multidimensional poverty. More than 64 per cent of Afghans live in multidimensional poverty, while rampant food in­security persists, with 17 million people facing acute hunger.

Distress and lost livelihood will increase manifold after Tal­iban’s First Deputy Prime Min­ister for Economic Affairs, Mul­la Abdul Ghani Baradar, issued a strongly-worded directive against maintaining trading re­lationships with Pakistan in mid-November 2025. He further an­nounced terminating all trading contracts with Pakistan in three months’ time, asking traders to explore other avenues of trade. It should be noted that alterna­tives in the form of Iranian trade routes prompt consideration of their feasibility. Tehran will not tolerate the Taliban’s present attitude, defined by diplomacy of terror, as Iran has nothing to gain from such engagement. This contrasts with Pakistan, where established trade corridors and CPEC offer tangible econom­ic and connectivity dividends, strengthening Islamabad’s re­gional integration incentives.

Such actions taken bythe Af­ghan Taliban are revealing their duplicitous behaviour, a rheto­ric that has to be adopted when they have continuously demon­strated their inability to keep their word. It should not be for­gotten that Pakistan has paid, and is still paying, a steep price for helping Afghanistan. The de­cades of conflict, which Afghan­istan was marred by, have had a spillover effect in the Pakistani society as illicit and informal economies became further en­trenched, unbridled smuggling, pernicious Kalashnikov culture, and proliferation of drug usage distorted social norms.

It must be emphatically noted that Pakistan has always dem­onstrated restraint in its engage­ment with Afghanistan. It was the first time that Pakistan became stern in its approach with Ka­bul, making it clear that concrete corrective actions are required for normalisation of bilater­al relations, rather than follow­ing India’s playbook dictated by Chanakya. It is high time that the Afghan Taliban understand that the suspension of trade by Paki­stan is not a temporary pressure tactic but a measure likely to en­dure. It is increasingly evident that unless Afghanistan puts its own house in order, provides Pakistan with the assurances it rightfully demands, and shows tangible progress on Pakistan’s security concerns, its options will remain constrained, making improvement in relations a ne­cessity rather than a choice.