ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS

Biological Risks, Global Conventions and Pakistan’s Options

November 5, 2025

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president

Air Marshal Asim Suleiman (Retd)

ROUNDTABLE COORDINATOR

Ezba Walayat Khan

EDITOR

Dr Zahid khan

MASTER OF CEREMONY

Ezba Walayat Khan

REPPORTEURS

Ezba Walayat Khan, Aqib Zardad

Executive Summary

The Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore, hosted a roundtable on 5 November 2025 titled “Biological Risks, Global Conventions and Pakistan’s Options” to analyse emerging biological threats, assess relevant international frameworks, and evaluate Pakistan’s policy measures. The discussion, led by Professor Dr Syed Javaid Khurshid, Consultant for Science Communication and Diplomacy at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s Ministerial Committee on Science and Technology Cooperation (COMSTECH), focused on two interconnected themes: understanding current biosafety and biosecurity conventions, treaties, and agreements along with their implementation challenges, and examining emerging global challenges in the enforcement of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Pakistan’s policy responses.

 

In her opening remarks, Ms Ezba Walayat Khan, Research Assistant at CASS, highlighted that advances in biotechnology offer vast potential to prevent disease and strengthen public health, while also introducing risks from inadvertent or intentional use of pathogens. She noted that the BWC provides the main framework for preventing such threats, but emerging technologies and dual-use research complicate enforcement. She emphasised that managing these risks requires robust regulation, international collaboration, and forward-looking policies to strengthen global biosecurity.

 

In the first session, Professor Dr Syed Javed Khurshid framed biosafety and biosecurity as critical yet underexplored aspects of modern science, emphasising that advances in biotechnology offer immense benefits but also carry risks such as accidental release, dual-use research, and deliberate misuse. He highlighted the importance of bridging the gap between scientists and the public, noting that effective communication, awareness, and responsibility are central to preventing biological threats. Drawing on his experience with COMSTECH and numerous UN engagements, he underlined Pakistan’s commitment to international norms, including the BWC and UNSCR 1540, while stressing that national implementation, oversight, and education are essential for resilience.

 

He outlined the historical evolution of biological threats, from early warfare practices to contemporary dual-use research, illustrating the necessity of robust regulation. He enumerated Pakistan’s initiatives, including early warning systems, biosafety guidelines, vaccine production, and institutional oversight, while advocating capacity building, regional collaboration, and integration of CBM principles into the education of life scientists. Highlighting the emerging role of aerospace biosafety and AI-based outbreak prediction, he noted that safeguarding public health and national security requires a coordinated approach combining scientific responsibility, ethical governance, and proactive diplomacy.

 

During the second session, Dr Khurshid further examined the practical and strategic dimensions of implementing the Biological Weapons Convention in the contemporary era, pointing to challenges such as inconsistent national enforcement, weak reporting, and the absence of formal verification. He stressed that rapidly evolving technologies, including synthetic biology, AI, and cyber, heighten these challenges. Drawing lessons from COVID-19, he emphasised the need for self-sufficient health-security infrastructure, resilient supply chains, and early-warning surveillance to address transboundary threats. Pakistan’s approach, he explained, integrates legislative enforcement, institutional strengthening, development of a trained bio-risk workforce, regional networks, and ethical governance of biotechnology. He highlighted that proactive vaccine production, adherence to voluntary codes of conduct, and engagement with global frameworks are essential for both national preparedness and leadership in biosecurity diplomacy.

 

The interactive session posed critical questions regarding the BWC compliance, vaccine production, bioterrorism risks, and public awareness. Professor Dr Syed Javaid Khurshid responded that while the BWC sets a normative framework, verification gaps create ambiguity. He highlighted Pakistan’s adherence to national measures and confidence-building practices. On vaccines, he stressed that domestic capacity exists, but limited infrastructure and policy prioritisation constrain production, making imports necessary. Regarding bioterrorism, Dr Khurshid observed that while anti-state actors currently lack technical sophistication, threats remain serious and require proactive monitoring and safety procedures. On international engagement, he noted that active participation in regimes such as the Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement is crucial for strengthening regulatory oversight and building international trust in Pakistan’s practices. Equally, public awareness and clear communication are vital for effective management of biological risks. The session concluded with a consensus that verification, domestic production, international engagement, and informed public discourse are vital to managing biological risks safely and effectively.

 

In his concluding remarks, Air Marshal Asim Suleiman (Retd), President CASS Lahore, stated that today’s security landscape is rapidly evolving, with biological threats crossing borders, bypassing institutions, and reshaping conflict. He noted that the COVID-19 pandemic revealed how a virus can disrupt economies, strain healthcare, and test national resilience. He highlighted that the BWC, though central to international law, lacks verification mechanisms, creating uncertainty, and complicating deterrence amid rising global tensions and expanding biotechnology for military purposes. He also warned that non-state actors and rogue individuals now have access to powerful synthetic biological tools, making intent the primary risk factor.

 

President CASS emphasised that Pakistan has acted responsibly within the international system, fulfilling BWC obligations through robust laws, and biosafety measures, exemplified by the Pakistan Biological Safety Association and the National Biosafety Centre. He noted that building resilience requires early warning systems, laboratory safety, bio-surveillance, and responsible scientific practice with ethical oversight of biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors. He concluded that Pakistan’s path depends on strong diplomacy, domestic preparedness, and a commitment to peace and transparency to protect the nation and global biological security.

 

 

 

Key Takeaways

  • Pakistan’s Adherence to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)

Pakistan implements robust measures to prohibit and prevent the development or possession of biological weapons, ensuring full compliance with its obligations under the Convention.

 

  • Existing Biosecurity Measures Provide a Foundation

Pakistan maintains a range of legislative and institutional measures, including the Drug Act 1976, Biosafety Guidelines 2005, and Disease Early Warning System (DEWS), providing a foundation for biosecurity while highlighting the need for continued strengthening.

 

  • Accessibility and Danger of Biological Weapons

Biological weapons pose a greater risk than a hydrogen bomb because they require far fewer technical steps, such as contaminating water with bacteria, and could have devastating consequences.

 

  • COVID-19 Reframed Health Security Worldwide

The COVID-19 pandemic showed that biological risks can no longer be treated as purely national concerns, as even advanced health systems proved vulnerable, making global cooperation essential.

 

  • Emerging Technologies Intensify Biological Risk

Rapidly advancing technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and cyber tools, have introduced new biological vulnerabilities, emphasising the need to update legal frameworks to prevent misuse.

 

  • Bioterrorism as a Security Challenge

Biosecurity concerns naturally highlight the threat of bioterrorism, where deliberate release of biological agents can cause disease, human deaths, crop losses, and widespread fear.

 

  • Detection and Protection from Biological Threats

Strong vaccination programmes must be paired with sensitive disease recognition by frontline health professionals coupled with efficient connectivity between laboratories, enabling rapid reporting and timely communication with national and international authorities.

Policy Considerations

  • Strengthen National Pathogen Risk Governance

A structured procedure for pathogen risk assessment that covers facilities, personnel, and material handling, supported by improved domestic production and secure storage of critical vaccines to close existing preparedness gaps should be introduced by Pakistan.

 

  • Reform Life Science Education and Awareness

Pakistan must integrate confidence building measures (CBM) into biology and biotechnology curricula to ensure that future scientists gain a clear understanding of their ethical and professional responsibilities when handling rapidly advancing biological agents.

 

  • Enhance Institutional Capacity and International Engagement

Pakistan needs to establish a dedicated authority to oversee CBM implementation, enabling universities to contribute to policymaking while drawing on international support to strengthen national biosecurity capacity.

 

  • Advance Early Warning Systems and Emerging Bio-surveillance Tools

Pakistan’s disease detection architecture must be upgraded by linking laboratories more effectively and incorporating advanced technologies, including satellite-based monitoring and airport-centred biosafety measures, to identify threats at their earliest stages.

 

  • Expand National and Regional Vaccine Preparedness

The manufacturing of essential vaccines in Pakistan needs to be scaled up in addition to creating a national or OIC-coordinated vaccine bank for maintaining reliable reserves for public use during emergencies.

 

  • Reinvigorate Governance and Regional Cooperation in Biosecurity

Pakistan should focus on strengthening the BWC, integrating biosafety into national security and innovation planning, and promoting regional cooperation through OIC and COMSTECH-led preparedness mechanisms.

 

  • Build a Skilled Bio Risk Workforce and Ethical Biotechnology Framework

A trained national workforce specialising in bio risk management should be developed by Pakistan together with strengthening ethical oversight of emerging biotechnologies so that safe innovation and responsible governance can advance in parallel.

 

 

CASS LAhore

The Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) was established in July 2021 to inform policymakers and the public about issues related to aerospace and security from an independent, non-partisan and future-centric analytical lens.

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