In a rapidly evolving security environment shaped by scientific innovation and global uncertainty, biological weapons have once again re-emerged as a critical contemporary challenge. Their inherent ambiguity, potential for covert use, and capacity to cause widespread disruption make them difficult to deter and attribute. Certain biological agents can inflict serious damage without provoking swift military action owing to lack of accountability, challenging deterrence and response strategies. Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, biological agents can be deployed covertly, offering both strategic advantage and political deniability.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the only legally binding treaty governing biological arms, and a pillar of the global non-proliferation regime. Although this treaty has guided international efforts for five decades, escalating biological threats reveal structural and political weaknesses, notably the absence of a verification mechanism and limitation in the existing confidence-building measures. Rapid biotechnological advances further complicate compliance, requiring vigilance and stronger commitment from all member states to uphold the treaty’s effectiveness.
Pakistan, as a responsible state party to the BWC, remains committed to upholding the peaceful applications of biological sciences and scientific advancements. It recognises the need for research and institutional cohesion to maintain national standards for biological safety and security that align with both global norms and domestic priorities.
Against this backdrop, the Centre for Aerospace and Security Studies (CASS), Lahore, organised a roundtable discussion titled “Biological Risks, Global Conventions and Pakistan’s Options.” The guest speaker, Prof Dr Javaid Khurshid, Consultant Science, Communication, and Diplomacy at COMSTECH, provided expert insights into biosafety and biosecurity conventions, and the challenges in implementing the BWC amid emerging threats. By linking these issues to strategic and policy considerations, the even fostered informed discussion on how Pakistan can enhance preparedness, strengthen its national frameworks, and navigate evolving global biological security challenges.
Pakistan implements robust measures to prohibit and prevent the development or possession of biological weapons, ensuring full compliance with its obligations under the Convention.
Pakistan maintains a range of legislative and institutional measures, including the Drug Act 1976, Biosafety Guidelines 2005, and Disease Early Warning System (DEWS), providing a foundation for biosecurity while highlighting the need for continued strengthening.
Biological weapons pose a greater risk than a hydrogen bomb because they require far fewer technical steps, such as contaminating water with bacteria, and could have devastating consequences.
The COVID-19 pandemic showed that biological risks can no longer be treated as purely national concerns, as even advanced health systems proved vulnerable, making global cooperation essential.
Rapidly advancing technologies, particularly artificial intelligence and cyber tools, have introduced new biological vulnerabilities, emphasising the need to update legal frameworks to prevent misuse.
Biosecurity concerns naturally highlight the threat of bioterrorism, where deliberate release of biological agents can cause disease, human deaths, crop losses, and widespread fear.
Strong vaccination programmes must be paired with sensitive disease recognition by frontline health professionals coupled with efficient connectivity between laboratories, enabling rapid reporting and timely communication with national and international authorities.
A structured procedure for pathogen risk assessment that covers facilities, personnel, and material handling, supported by improved domestic production and secure storage of critical vaccines to close existing preparedness gaps should be introduced by Pakistan.
Pakistan must integrate confidence building measures (CBM) into biology and biotechnology curricula to ensure that future scientists gain a clear understanding of their ethical and professional responsibilities when handling rapidly advancing biological agents.
Pakistan needs to establish a dedicated authority to oversee CBM implementation, enabling universities to contribute to policymaking while drawing on international support to strengthen national biosecurity capacity.
Pakistan’s disease detection architecture must be upgraded by linking laboratories more effectively and incorporating advanced technologies, including satellite-based monitoring and airport-centred biosafety measures, to identify threats at their earliest stages.
The manufacturing of essential vaccines in Pakistan needs to be scaled up in addition to creating a national or OIC-coordinated vaccine bank for maintaining reliable reserves for public use during emergencies.
Pakistan should focus on strengthening the BWC, integrating biosafety into national security and innovation planning, and promoting regional cooperation through OIC and COMSTECH-led preparedness mechanisms.
A trained national workforce specialising in bio risk management should be developed by Pakistan together with strengthening ethical oversight of emerging biotechnologies so that safe innovation and responsible governance can advance in parallel.
A comprehensive report capturing expert analyses, strategic insights, key recommendations, media coverage, and event highlights.








The Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies (CASS) was established in July 2021 to inform policymakers and the public about issues related to aerospace and security from an independent, non-partisan and future-centric analytical lens.
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